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Abstract 
Global ballast water management regulations aiming to decrease aquatic species invasion require 
actions that can increase shipping costs. We employ an integrated shipping cost and global 
economic modeling approach to investigate the impacts of ballast water regulations on bilateral 
trade, national economies, and shipping patterns. Given the potential need for more stringent 
regulation at regional hotspots of species invasions, this work considers two ballast water 
treatment policy scenarios: implementation of current international regulations, and a possible 
stricter regional regulation that targets ships traveling to and from the United States while other 
vessels continue to face current standards. We find that ballast water management compliance 
costs under both scenarios lead to modest negative impacts on international trade and national 
economies overall. However, stricter regulations applied to U.S. ports are expected to have large 
negative impacts on bilateral trade of several specific commodities for a few countries. Trade 
diversion causes decreased U.S. imports of some products, leading to minor economic welfare 
losses.  
Keywords: Ballast water management; environmental regulation; economics; international 
trade; shipping patterns; computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling.   
 
1. Introduction 
Vessels routinely intake and discharge ballast water, corresponding to carried cargo, to 
maintain their stability. This activity transports organisms contained in ballast water from one 
place to another. If the discharge occurs outside the organisms’ native range, there is potential 
for the species to become established and invasive. More than half of all marine invasive species 
are attributed to transfers by global commercial shipping (Molnar et al., 2008, Saebi et al., 2019), 
with around 10,000 species estimated to have been transported in ballast water (Bax et al., 2003). 
The impacts of invasive species on the environment and economic activities have been long 
investigated and found to impose negative impacts on the economy, ecosystem and human health 
(Carlton, 2003, Chan et al., 2019, Lovell et al., 2006, Wan et al., 2016, Wan et al., 2018, David 
et al., 2019).  
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Ballast water management (BWM) regulations attempt to reduce risk of species’ spread and 
associated negative impacts. The International Convention on the Control and Management of 
Ship’s Ballast Water and Sediments (the BWM Convention) of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), for example, defines allowable concentrations for viable organisms and 
certain human health indicator microbes contained in discharged ballast water in the D-2 
Standard. While most countries are parties to the BWM Convention, the U.S. is not. Instead, the 
U.S. independently regulates ballast water discharge according to the 2018 Vessel Incidental 
Discharge Act (VIDA). Section 151.1511 or 151.2030 of Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations 
(or successor regulations) establishes the U.S. ballast water discharge standard, which is 
currently the same as the BWM Convention. However, individual states of the U.S. can set 
independent standards. California’s interim performance standards, in effect from January 2030, 
establish limits for the number of organisms for different functional groups, which are the stricter 
than the BWM Convention1. California’s final performance standard goal, in effect from January 
2040, is to achieve zero detectable living organisms for all size classes. Current IMO standards 
are species concentration-based, instead of risk-based. Risks are not clearly mitigated by current 
standards, so there is a need for more stringent location-specific regulations at invasion hotspots 
(Verna and Harris, 2016, Saebi et al., 2019). To comply with the interim California performance 
standards, the California State Lands Commission funded a study to assess the feasibility of 
barge-based treatment methods (California State Lands Commission, 2018).  
Compliance technology (i.e., type-approved ballast water treatment systems [BWTS]) are 
available to vessel operators to comply with both regulations and reduce species invasion risk. 
However, better systems may be necessary to achieve risk reduction targets. Procuring and 
installing BWTS on ships requires both capital and operating costs (King et al., 2009), and more 
advanced BWTS to comply with stricter regulations (if set) would cost more (Glosten et al., 
2018). Vessel operators may reduce shipping services or costs may be passed on to cargo owners 
and eventually to final consumers (Tseng et al., 2005, Schinas and Stefanakos, 2012), which may 
negatively impact economic performance of particular sectors (Tseng et al., 2005). Herein, we 
assess the economic impacts of current international regulations and proposed location-specific 
 
1 California interim ballast water limits are as follows: no detectable living organisms greater than 50 micrometers in 
minimum dimension; less than 0.01 living organisms per milliliter less than 50 and more than 10 micrometers; less 
than 1000 bacteria and less than 10,000 virus per 100 milliliter, and different standards for Escherichia coli and 
Intestinal enterococci. 
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alternatives including changes in international trade and transport (Estevadeordal et al., 2003, 
Hummels, 2007, Jacks et al., 2008). Shipping patterns serve as powerful tools in understanding 
environmental risk and analyzing policies, particularly those targeting marine bio-invasions and 
shipping emissions (Corbett et al., 2010, Wang et al., 2007, Johansson et al., 2017, Seebens et 
al., 2013). However, shipping patterns are dynamic, affected by economic policies (Halim et al., 
2018a), climate change (Smith and Stephenson, 2013), and environmental regulations.  
This work examines three aspects of impacts from current and future ballast water 
regulations: bilateral trade of specific commodities, overall impacts on national economies, and 
global shipping patterns by vessel type. This work can help inform risk-based assessments and 
allow comparisons of policies such as between current vessel-based treatment standards and 
additional measures to mitigate shipborne aquatic invasion risks. Our analysis informs 
evaluations of economic costs of decreasing risk of nonindigenous species spread in future 
policy contexts. Specific scenarios examined in this analysis are: 
• Scenario 1 (Consistent BWM Regulation): This scenario is consistent with the current 
BWM regulation that all international and regional regulations require similar 
numeric standards of the BWM Convention.  
• Scenario 2 (Stricter BWM Regulation): All ports in the U.S. adopt stricter BWM 
standards, following the regulation in California, while ports in all other countries 
apply the numeric standards of the BWM Convention.   
We do not predict future policies but propose scenarios to explore the viability to drive policies 
forward. Choosing a U.S. based scenario adopting nationally the stringent standards of one state 
(California) is not without precedent. Many federal environmental policies since adoption of the 
Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act have essentially learned from and expanded standards 
initiated by one U.S. state. Moreover, our research uses the U.S. as an example in shipping 
policy, partly because there is precedent where international shipping adopted standards set by 
the U.S. One example is international double hull construction requirements for tank ships 
following U.S. enaction of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Lastly, insights from our analysis 
extend beyond investigation based on U.S. taking more stringent action (i.e., Singapore or 
Europe); this scenario design affords a major economy with hundreds of ports that trade with 
most of the major trading nations. We believe the study design is well suited to the economic-
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technology-environmental question of action to mitigate aquatic species invasion by ships. It is 
also important to note that our analysis does not evaluate or quantify the economic benefits of 
increased BWTS standards and corresponding decreased risk of nonindigenous species spread. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the methods and data. 
Section 3 provides the analysis of results and discussion, and Section 4 concludes this work. 
2. Methodology 
This research employs an innovative approach by integrating a shipping cost model and a 
global economic model to examine the impacts of ballast water management regulations on 
international trade, shipping traffic, and the overall economy. Figure 1 gives an outline of the 
data, model and outputs. The shipping cost model estimates changes in transport costs resulting 
from ballast regulation, which are employed as exogenous shocks to the marine transportation 
sector in the economic model to quantify changes in bilateral commodity trade and 
corresponding changes in national economies. Simulated changes in bilateral trade then serve as 
inputs for the shipping traffic accumulation model, which identifies potential changes in global 
shipping traffic. We include 20 countries2 facing the highest compliance costs, most shipping 
voyages, and largest trade flows. We analyze nation-specific data and results for these countries 
and include all other countries as the aggregate rest of the world region.   
 
2 Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, the United States, Canada, Mexico, Columbia, 
Panama, Venezuela, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and South Africa. 
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Figure 1. Outline of data, models, and outputs 
2.1 Shipping cost model and data 
The shipping cost model is composed of two parts: the current shipping cost model and the 
regulation compliance cost model. We calculate the shipping cost and compliance cost separately 
for each vessel type and every voyage. We then aggregate all voyages in one year to get the 
annual total current shipping cost and total compliance cost for each pair of countries. From this, 
we calculate the percentage increases in international shipping costs (the first component in 
Figure 1), which are used as exogenous shocks in the economic model. 
Baseline shipping cost for each vessel move 
Shipping costs without ballast water management for each shipping voyage are the same over 
the two policy scenarios. The baseline shipping cost is comprised of capital, operating, and daily 
fuel costs. The cost components differ by vessel type; hence, the models are built separately for 
container, bulk, and tanker vessels. We estimate the total shipping costs for each vessel type with 
the daily shipping costs and voyage durations (See the descriptions in the Data section).  
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Increased shipping cost due to regulatory compliance 
Baseline shipping costs increase across vessel types according to compliance costs of each 
regulation. In this regard, it is estimated that type-approved BWTS can be used to meet the 
regulatory standards required by the BWM Convention (labeled as IMO-BWTS). IMO-BWTS 
can be applied to vessels or barges. On the other hand, the barge-based BWTS assessed by the 
California State Lands Commission are intended to meet California’s interim stricter standards 
(labeled as stricter-BWTS) as described in footnote 1 on page 2 (Glosten et al., 2018).  
Because IMO-BWTS and barge-based BWTS generate different increases in shipping costs 
(i.e., the compliance costs), appropriate allocation of them to be vessel- or port-based can 
minimize the compliance cost. We identified the most economically efficient solutions for the 
world fleet in previous work (Wang and Corbett, 2020). That is, the fleet-wide most 
economically efficient pathway to comply with the Consistent Regulation scenario (Scenario 1) 
is to install vessel-based IMO-BWTS on every vessel; and the most economically efficient 
pathway to comply with the Stricter Regulation scenario (Scenario 2) is to use vessel-based 
IMO-BWTS at non-U.S. ports and use barge-based stricter-BWTS at U.S. ports. Then, with the 
following models, we compute the increased shipping costs due to regulatory compliance, which 
are composed of expenses associated with the BWTS capital, installation, operation, and ballast 
water treatment.  
(1) Regulatory compliance cost model under Consistent Regulation 
The compliance cost for each shipping voyage is obtained from Equation 1. Not all voyages 
calling at one port discharge ballast water, and we assume the discharge probability is 0.5 
(Seebens et al., 2013). The capital and install costs are one-time costs used to calculate annual 
costs (lifetime of 30 years, a discount rate of 6%, and an annual inflation rate of 2.5%). Then we 
equally distribute annual costs to all voyages of that vessel because all the voyages use the 
onboard BWTS to treat discharged ballast water. The treatment cost for each voyage is obtained 
with the volume of discharged ballast water and unit treatment cost. 
                       (𝐶𝑣−𝑖𝑚𝑜 + 𝑂𝑣−𝑖𝑚𝑜)/𝑁𝑣 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑜 ∗ 𝑉𝑣                                   (Equation 1) 
Where 
𝐶𝑣−𝑖𝑚𝑜: annual capital cost and installation cost of vessel-based IMO-BWTS ($)  
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𝑂𝑣−𝑖𝑚𝑜: annual operating cost for vessel-based IMO-BWTS ($) 
𝑁𝑣: the number of treatments of vessel v in one year; the capital, installation, and operating 
costs are assumed to be shared by all treatments of that vessel 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑜: treatment cost of IMO-BWTS for each treatment tonnage ($/ton) 
𝑉𝑣: ballast water treatment volume of vessel v at that voyage (ton) 
(2) Regulation compliance cost model under Inconsistent Regulation 
Vessels often have different compliance costs because they call at different ports. We divide 
vessels into two groups: never call at U.S. ports, and may call at U.S. ports. Figure 2 shows the 
three kinds of voyages and corresponding equations used to calculate the compliance cost for 
each kind of voyage.  
 
Figure 2. Three kinds of voyages determined by the vessel and voyage destination 
If a vessel never calls at a U.S. port, it only needs to meet the IMO standard with the onboard 
IMO-BWTS, and the compliance cost is same as Equation 1.  
If a vessel ever calls at a U.S. port, and the destination port of its voyage is a U.S. port, the 
discharged ballast water must meet stricter regulation, and the compliance cost calculation for 
that voyage follows Equation 2. We assume the costs of all barge-based BWTS are shared by 
voyages to U.S. ports, and the shared cost for each voyage is determined by the ballast water 
discharge volume of that voyage. The treatment cost is obtained according to the volume of 
discharged ballast water and the higher unit treatment cost. In addition, a cost component 
accounting for tug cost is added because barge-based BWTS need tugs to be moved and fixed.  
  (𝐶𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 + 𝐶𝑝−𝑢𝑠 + 𝑂𝑝−𝑢𝑠) ∗ 𝑃𝑢𝑠 ∗ 𝑉𝑣/ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑙_𝑈𝑆 +  𝑇𝑢𝑠 ∗ 𝑉𝑣 + 𝑇𝑡𝑢𝑔                      (Equation 2) 
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Where 
𝐶𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒: annual capital cost and installation cost for one barge ($) 
𝐶𝑝−𝑢𝑠: annual capital cost and installation cost for barge-based stricter-BWTS ($) 
𝑂𝑝−𝑢𝑠: the sum of annual operating cost for one barge-based stricter-BWTS and one barge 
($) 
𝑃𝑢𝑠: the number of ports in the U.S., which need stricter-BWTS at port 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑙_𝑢𝑠: the total volume of treated ballast water at all U.S. ports per year (ton) 
𝑇𝑢𝑠: treatment cost of stricter-BWTS for each treatment tonnage ($/ton) 
𝑇𝑡𝑢𝑔: the cost to use a tug per treatment ($/treatment) 
If the vessel ever calls at a U.S. port, but the destination port of that voyage is not a U.S. port, 
the compliance cost estimation for that voyage follows Equation 3. For that voyage, the vessel 
must meet the IMO-standard with the onboard BWTS. Accordingly, that voyage shares a part of 
the vessel-based IMO-BWTS costs with the other voyages using it for treatment.   
               (𝐶𝑣−𝑖𝑚𝑜 + 𝑂𝑣−𝑖𝑚𝑜)/𝑁𝑣_𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑜 ∗ 𝑉𝑣                                     (Equation 3)      
Where 
𝑁𝑣_𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟: the number of treatments at non-U.S. ports of vessel v in one year.                  
To verify the compliance cost model, we sum compliance costs of all voyages to get the 
compliance cost for the world fleet. Then we compare that with the fleet cost obtained from the 
fleet compliance cost model (Wang and Corbett, 2020) and get the same number.            
Data 
Data used for the cost model include shipping movements, daily shipping costs, ballast water 
discharge volume, and costs of BWTS. We use the data purchased from Lloyd’s List Intelligence 
that gives movement of vessels throughout the world prior to potential treatment cost. The data 
include Vessel ID, Origin/Destination port, Port ID, Origin/Destination country, 
Departure/Arrival time, along with vessel specifications (Vessel Type, Deadweight Tonnage 
(DWT), Year of build, and other descriptive data). Since the BWM Convention applies only to 
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ships with international voyages, we exclude movements of ships that travel within a country. 
The final dataset includes 714,039 individual vessel moves.  
The voyage durations are obtained from Lloyd’s List Intelligence. Daily shipping costs are 
derived from the Guide to Deep-Draft Vessel Operating with a 2002 base year (US Army Corps 
of Engineers, 2002), following the literature (Corbett et al., 2009, Dumas and Whitehead, 2008, 
The EPA, 2012). To verify that these daily shipping costs reflect current costs, we run the 
recently established container vessel shipping cost model for vessels in sizes of 600, 1600, 2500, 
4000, and 6000 TEU and get similar daily costs (Wang et al., 2020). We also confirm that capital 
costs derived from the USACE publication are consistent with current costs using long-run 
analyses by the OECD (OECD and BRS Group, 2018). We believe this demonstrates that 
overcapacity in shipbuilding continues to impact market cycles and demand pricing, and partly 
because unit costs often decline over time for technology. If higher shipping cost baselines were 
used in the analysis, the relative effect of BTWS costs would be smaller. With these baseline 
shipping costs, we believe the relative effect of added ballast water treatment costs provides 
reasonable and conservative estimates for exogenous shocks to the global economic model.   
We estimate ballast water discharge volume for each shipping voyage with a regression 
following Seebens et al. (2013), with ballast water discharge data published by the National 
Ballast Information Clearinghouse (National Ballast Information Clearinghouse, 2019, Seebens 
et al., 2013). Not all ships discharge ballast water when entering a port; the fraction of port 
arrivals without ballast water discharge is estimated to be between 42% and 88%, depending on 
vessel type (Seebens et al., 2013). Hence, we assume a ballast water discharge probability of 
50% in this study. For vessels with missing DWT information, we use an average discharge 
volume to estimate ballast discharge volumes.  
Several works estimate the cost of barge-based BWTS (Glosten et al., 2018, COWI A/S, 
2012, Maglić et al., 2015, King and Hagan, 2013), and we use cost estimates from Glosten et al. 
for California to achieve stricter-standard (Glosten et al., 2018). Though a barge-based BWTS 
industry is not in place, the Glosten et al. (2018) report is the best estimate that can be obtained. 
The work of King and Hagan provides cost data for the IMO-standard BWTS (King et al., 2009). 
These two reports include various BWTS with different cost estimates for different vessels. This 
work does not aim to identify the best BWTS for each vessel; rather, we investigate costs of the 
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whole world fleet. Therefore, we use the average of the highest and lowest values from the 
literature to represent the best estimates. The lower cost values are within 0.75 times of the 
average and higher cost values are within 1.5 times of the average.  
2.2 Economic model and data 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model  
This work uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) modeling framework known as 
GTAP (Global Trade and Analysis Project), specifically an extension of the GTAP-
Energy/Environment (GTAP-E) model by Nong and Siriwardana (2017). The GTAP-E model is 
widely used and has been employed to examine the impacts of various policies on international 
trade (for example, see Baier and Bergstrand (2009); Bekkers et al. (2016); Countryman et al. 
(2016)). CGE models include interactions between producers, consumers, investors, households, 
and governments. Though CGE models require more calibration data and behavioral 
assumptions than sector-specific economic models, CGE models are useful when relationships 
between sectors or countries are important or when policies imposed on one sector have 
economy-wide impacts, which are all likely to be true when considering policies targeting 
transportation and shipping sectors. A brief description of the model and specific changes made 
for this analysis area given here; more details on the model structure can be found in Nong and 
Siriwardana (2017).  
Economic agents in the model include households, government, industries, and investors. 
Households and governments are the final consumers in each country; they buy goods and 
services supplied by domestic and international industries. Households maximize utility subject 
to their budget constraints. A household receives income by supplying labor, and the government 
receives tax revenue (sales tax, business taxes, import and export taxes, and investment taxes). 
Industries provide outputs for final consumers and goods used in the production process of other 
sectors. The production process in each sector uses goods produced domestically and from 
international markets, labor, capital, and other resources. In addition, national economies are 
connected by bilateral trade for each commodity in the model.  
The model includes transportation services, such as water, air, road, and rail, which are used 
to facilitate trade between sectors and countries. Industries use transportation services to move 
products to other sectors in domestic and international markets. For example, agricultural 
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industries in China may use road and rail transport services to transport agricultural goods to 
customers in India, while air and/or water transport services are used to move products to 
customers in the U.S. or Canada. Agricultural industries in China also use transportation services 
to move products to other industries and final customers in their domestic market. 
In this model, changes in transport costs affect consumer and industry purchasing power, 
thereby affecting trade volumes between sectors and countries. That is, demands for 
commodities will change when commodity prices change. For example, if transportation costs 
from China to the U.S. fall, and other conditions held constant, U.S. customers will substitute 
away from relatively higher priced suppliers and purchase cheaper products from China. All 
agents are connected; therefore, changes in transport costs associated with ballast water 
treatment lead to changes in global trade patterns.  
We use the GTAP-E database version 9, which represents the world economy in 2011 
(Aguiar et al., 2016) in tandem with the modified GTAP-E model. The global database includes 
production, consumption, investment, import, and export values3. We aggregate 134 regions into 
21 regions as discussed in Section 2.1 and aggregate 57 sectors/commodities into 17 main 
sector/commodity groups, which are mapped with 8 vessel types as described in Appendix A.  
2.3 Trade to shipping traffic  
The next step is to estimate changes in shipping traffic for container, bulk, and tanker vessels 
given the results of the economic model (the lowest part in Figure 1). Accordingly, we estimate 
changes in shipping voyages for different vessel types with the DWT of vessels engaged in trade 
and allocated to a route (Equation 4), which are determined by the simulated changes in total 
trade from the economic model (Equation 5). The total DWTs in the equations represent demand 
for total DWT of the working world fleet of each vessel type.  
             Change in shipping voyages = 
change in total allocated DWT 
vessels′ average DWT 
               (Equation 4) 
                        Value/weight ratio = 
current total trade value
current total cargo volume
=
change in trade value
change in cargo volume
                                                  
 
3 The database is measured in U.S. dollars. Exchange rates do not play any role in this modeling.  
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                  = 
current total trade value
current allocated DWT ∗ α
=
change in trade value
change in total allocated DWT * α 
          (Equation 5) 
First, value/weight ratios are estimated for different commodities between different countries 
(Halim et al., 2018a, Halim et al., 2018b) to serve as a bridge to link the status quo and changes 
due to regulatory compliance for the same commodity between the same country pair. Second, 
we assume the utilization of a shipping route is constant, i.e., the cargo volume carried by a 
vessel is assumed to be constant with the proportion of its DWT.  
3. Results and discussion 
We present findings for changes in shipping costs, followed by the economic impacts on 
trade and national economies, and changes in global shipping traffic as a result of BWM 
regulations defined by Scenarios 1 and 2. Transportation industries account for small 
contributions to the global economy in terms of monetary values, which leads to modest 
aggregate economic effects. However, we find substantial impacts on certain commodities, 
countries, and shipping routes.  
3.1 Changes in shipping costs  
Changes in shipping costs for container vessels, bulk vessels, and tankers are provided in 
Tables S1–S6 in the Supplementary Material. The average compliance cost (per vessel) of these 
three vessels accounts for 1.5% of the current shipping cost under Scenario 1, and 2% under 
Scenario 2. These percentages become 4.6% and 4.9% when all vessel types are included (Wang 
and Corbett, 2020). The current shipping cost is composed of operating cost (14%), periodic 
maintenance (4%), voyage cost (40%), and capital cost (42%) (Stopford, 2009). The average 
ballast water management compliance cost is lower than the periodic maintenance cost.  
Shipping costs for voyages between most countries in both scenarios do not change 
substantially; however, costs for routes between some country pairs change greatly. Therefore, 
we report the pairs of countries with large cost changes, i.e., larger than 10% for at least one 
vessel type, in Table 1. Overall, Scenario 2, which provides better protection from species 
invasion, leads to the largest increases in shipping costs across vessel types.  
 14 
Table 1. Changes in shipping costs in 2011 for three vessel types traveling between countries 
Note: Scenario 1 corresponds to Consistent IMO BWM Regulation and Scenario 2 represents the U.S. Stricter BWM Regulation. 
Percentages rounded to integral for reader comparison; percentages less than 1% are round to 1%. Dollars rounded to thousand. The 
routes shown have at least a 10% change in cost for one of the ship types. No traffic may between the routes for certain vessel types, 
shown with -. Countries are shown in three-digits Code: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/knowledgebase/country-code. 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Pair of 
countries 
Container: 
Scenario 1 
Container: 
Scenario 2 
Bulk: 
Scenario 1 
Bulk: 
Scenario 2 
Tanker: 
Scenario 1 
Tanker: 
Scenario 2 
% 
$ 
Thousand 
% 
$ 
Thousand 
% 
$ 
Thousand 
% 
$ 
Thousand 
% 
$ 
Thousand 
% 
$ 
Thousand 
CAN/USA 2 800 15 7,800 3 4,000 36 46,000 2 1,600 14 16,000 
COL/USA 1 150 8 1,300 2 560 15 5,100 1 890 9 8,900 
MEX/USA 1 750 11 7,700 3 2,200 27 21,000 2 3,600 16 39,000 
PAN/USA 1 1,800 6 13,000 2 3,100 16 25,000 1 2,300 8 19,000 
VEN/USA 1 73 11 750 2 500 11 500 1 1,800 8 19,000 
ESP/MEX 11 5 11 5 1 3 1 3 1 10 1 11 
MEX/VEN 23 3 23 3 1 22 5 27 1 34 2 41 
AUS/USA 7 2 53 11 1 210 4 1250 1 18 2 133 
BEL/AUS - - - - 22 3 23 4 - - - - 
VEN/AUS - - - - 25 5 25 5 - - - - 
BEL/GBR - - - - 10 1,200 11 1,300 4 1,990 4 2080 
DEU/VEN - - - - 19 2 19 2 - - - - 
NLD/VEN - - - - 23 3 24   3 - - - - 
DEU/USA 1 50 3 520 1 65 9 720 1 8 14 76 
PAN/MYS - - - - 1 4 1 5 23 2 24 2 
CHN/PAN 1 540 1 680 1 1100 1 1230 22 4 23 4 
ESP/SGP - - - - 1 7 1 7 14 300 14 300 
KOR/VEN - - - - - - - - 15 2 15 2 
ZAF/VEN - - - - 1 9 1 9 15 5 16 5 
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The high percentage changes are a result of high compliance costs or relatively low baseline 
shipping costs. For example, the percentage change in container vessel shipping from Belgium to 
Australia in Table 1 is as high as 22%, but its absolute cost change is only $3,000. In contrast, 
the percentage change for a container vessel voyage from Belgium to the UK is less than half of 
the aforementioned value (10%), but the absolute cost change is $1.2 million. This is because of 
the relatively high baseline shipping cost from Belgium to the UK and lower baseline shipping 
cost from Belgium to Australia. The baseline shipping cost from Belgium to the UK is higher 
than that of Belgium to Australia, even though the distance is shorter, because there are a greater 
number of voyages that occur. The country-to-country shipping cost is aggregated over all 
shipping voyages between a country pair.  
Table 1 indicates more country pairs have large changes in shipping costs for bulk vessels 
and tankers. The average change in shipping costs of tankers are 3.4% and 3.9% under Scenario 
1 and 2, respectively. The changes are 1.8% and 2.4% for bulk vessels, and 1.3% and 1.7% for 
container vessels. This reveals that ballast water discharge regulations fall more heavily on bulk 
vessels and tankers, and this is true for both Consistent IMO Regulation (Scenario 1) and Stricter 
Regulation (Scenario 2). This is attributed to several possible reasons: First, bulk vessels and 
tankers have fewer annual voyages per vessel on average (9 and 13 voyages), compared to 
container vessels (18 voyages), so the cost of vessel-based BWTS is shared among fewer 
voyages, causing higher cost changes4. Second, bulk vessels and tankers discharge more ballast 
water in total (389 and 280 million tons) compared to container vessels (108 million tons), so 
bulk vessels and tankers have higher treatment costs under both scenarios.  
Changes in shipping costs under the two scenarios are similar in the magnitude for country 
pairs other than the U.S., indicating that regionally stricter ballast water regulation and better 
protection from aquatic invasion has minimal impact on non-U.S. routes. Relatively small 
differences that arise for some country pairs can be explained with the cost models. Taking a 
country pair, A-B for example, the shipping cost calculation only includes the voyages from A to 
B of all vessels. However, some vessels undertake many voyages and travel to other countries 
besides B. If all the destinations are non-U.S. countries, then the costs are identical in Scenarios 
1 and 2. This is because the vessel only needs to meet the IMO standard with its onboard BWTS, 
 
4 The data are from authors’ calculations. 
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and the increased compliance cost refers to the cost of the BWTS that does not change across the 
two regulatory scenarios. If the vessel travels to U.S. ports besides B, then shipping costs 
increase more under Scenario 2. This is because under Scenario 2, the vessel must use port-based 
BWTS to treat ballast water at U.S. ports to achieve the stricter standards and use vessel-based 
BWTS at other ports. In this way, the compliance cost includes some of the port-based cost and 
its onboard BWTS. However, under Scenario 1, the compliance cost only refers to the cost of its 
vessel-based BWTS, which is lower than costs incurred under Scenario 2. 
3.2 Impacts on International Trade and National Economies 
The impacts of increased costs from BWM in Scenarios 1 and 2 cause relatively minor 
changes to aggregate trade levels across countries; however, noteworthy decreases in bilateral 
trade of certain commodities between trade partners occurs. In Scenario 1, when all countries 
follow the international standard to the BWM Convention, the induced costs are relatively small, 
as fully described previously, leading to corresponding minor impacts on overall trade between 
all countries. Columns (1) and (5) in Table 2 show that imports and exports for most countries 
decline by less than 0.1%. Stricter standards outlined in Scenario 2 lead to larger changes in trade 
than Scenario 1, and trade between the U.S. and its primary trading partners are affected the 
most. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 show that exports from Australia, the U.S., and Canada 
decline by 0.14% ($380 million), 0.31% ($5.7 billion), and 0.25% ($1.2 billion), respectively. In 
addition, imports into several countries also decrease by 0.27% ($700 million) for Australia, 
0.33% ($8.8 billion) for the U.S., 0.4% ($1.9 billion) for Canada, 0.24% ($770 million) for 
Mexico, and 0.34% ($180 million) for Venezuela. 
Although aggregate, country-level, changes in trade are minor, there are noteworthy 
disruptions in bilateral trade of several commodities resulting from increased BWM regulatory 
compliance costs. Table 3 provides changes in bilateral commodity trade shipped by container, 
bulk, and tanker vessels. In general, changes in bilateral exports of commodities are highly and 
negatively correlated with changes in shipping costs of vessels, as expected. For example, in 
Scenario 1, the shipping cost of container vessels from China to Venezuela increases by 8.83% 
(Table S1 in Supplementary Material), and exports of commodities transported by container 
vessels for this route decrease by -1 to -2.6% (Table 3). By contrast, shipping costs of container 
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vessels from Mexico to China only increase by 0.13% in Scenario 1 (Table S1), leading to a 
0.1% change in exports transported by container vessels for this route (Table 3).    
 
Table 2. Changes in real aggregate imports and exports by country  
Countries 
Exports Imports 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
% 
change 
Real change  
($ million) 
% 
change 
Real change  
($ million) 
% 
change 
Real change  
($ million) 
% 
change 
Real change  
($ million) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
Australia -0.04 -110 -0.14 -380 -0.08 -220 -0.27 -700 
China -0.06 -1,200 -0.05 -950 -0.1 -1,700 -0.08 -1,300 
Japan -0.03 -300 -0.01 -130 -0.05 -510 -0.02 -210 
South Korea -0.02 -150 0 8 -0.04 -250 -0.01 -42 
Singapore -0.02 -59 0 -6 -0.02 -45 0.02 58 
Malaysia -0.03 -80 -0.02 -42 -0.07 -140 -0.05 -100 
Taiwan -0.03 -120 -0.02 -90 -0.06 -170 -0.04 -120 
USA -0.03 -580 -0.31 -5,700 -0.04 -990 -0.33 -8,800 
Canada -0.05 -250 -0.25 -1,200 -0.08 -400 -0.4 -1,900 
Mexico -0.02 -88 -0.06 -200 -0.07 -220 -0.24 -770 
Colombia -0.02 -10 -0.04 -20 -0.06 -34 -0.19 -110 
Panama -0.05 -9 -0.13 -22 -0.05 -18 -0.11 -37 
Venezuela -0.03 -25 -0.06 -45 -0.14 -71 -0.34 -180 
Belgium 0.01 43 0.03 140 0.01 47 0.04 160 
Germany 0 -30 0.01 160 0 6 0.02 320 
Spain -0.01 -23 0 7 -0.01 -49 0 -8 
France 0.01 81 0.03 210 0.01 76 0.03 220 
UK -0.04 -290 -0.01 -80 -0.05 -420 -0.02 -170 
Netherlands 0 -17 0.02 74 -0.01 -39 0.02 65 
South Africa -0.01 -15 0 -5 -0.03 -31 -0.01 -16 
Rest of World -0.03 -2,400 -0.04 -2,900 -0.06 -4,300 -0.08 -5,700 
The whole world -0.03 -5,600 -0.06 -11,000 -0.05 -9,500 -0.1 -19,000 
Note: Scenario 1 corresponds to the Consistent IMO BWM Regulation and Scenario 2 represents 
the U.S. Stricter BWM Regulation. Export values are measured at FOB (free on board) prices, 
which include the costs of delivering goods to the ports. Import values are measured in CIF (cost 
insurance and freight) prices, which include transportation costs and insurance fees to having 
goods to the port of destinations. Percentages rounded to two decimals, and dollars rounded to 
millions, for reader comparison; smaller numbers do not imply precision.  
Source: Authors’ simulations 
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Table 3: Changes in exports by commodity between countries. 
Vessel 
types 
Commodities 
Australia to China to USA to 
USA Venezuela Canada Mexico 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Bulk Crop products 0.2 0 2.7 0.3 0 0 -0.4 0 -1 -3.4 -2.9 -9.4 -0.2 -0.5 -1.7 -4.9 
Bulk Wheat and grains 0.3 0 5.7 0 0.4 0 0.1 0 -0.8 -3.1 -1.8 -6.8 -0.3 -14 -0.8 -32.3 
Bulk Coal 0.4 0 5.3 0.2 0.3 0 -0.2 0 -1.8 -8.1 -3.7 -16.6 -1.4 -2.4 -2.3 -4.1 
Container Forestry and foods -1.6 -16.5 -21.1 -220.9 -2.3 -0.4 -2.5 -0.4 -0.2 -21.1 -0.6 -63.8 -0.3 -19.7 -0.6 -42.9 
Container Textiles -2.7 -6.7 -33.9 -83.4 -2.6 -22.1 -2.9 -24.7 -0.3 -44.3 -1 -142.4 -0.2 -18.1 -0.5 -56.2 
Container Metal & chemicals -1.3 -46.1 -18.8 -686.9 -2.6 -27.3 -2.8 -29.5 -0.3 -160.3 -0.8 -502.6 -0.1 -47.9 -0.4 -207.8 
Container Machine & equip. -0.7 -21.5 -12.1 -368.2 -1 -36.9 -1.1 -42.6 -0.1 -57.2 -0.5 -284.6 0 -12.7 -0.3 -119.1 
Tanker Oil products 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.8 -0.1 0 -0.2 0 0.2 22.8 -0.5 -59.5 -0.2 -47 -0.8 -164 
Tanker Gas 1.3 0.2 3.9 0.5 0.5 0 -0.6 0 -0.5 -12.1 -1.4 -31.1 -0.7 -12.8 -2.3 -44.2 
Tanker Crude oil 0.2 0.4 1.1 2.4 0.4 0 -0.2 0 -0.5 -1.8 -2.4 -8 -3 0 -6.5 0 
Vessel 
types 
Commodities 
Canada to Spain to Colombia to 
USA Mexico China USA 
Bulk Crop products 0 0.1 -1.6 -7.4 0.2 0 -0.3 0 0.1 0 1.9 0 -0.7 -12.8 -6.3 -119.3 
Bulk Wheat and grains -0.4 -5.2 -6.2 -82.5 0.8 0 1 0 0.1 0 0.6 0 -0.1 0 2.3 0 
Bulk Coal -0.8 -1.5 -14.4 -28.1 0.5 0 0.4 0 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.3 -0.3 -2.1 -2 -16.4 
Container Forestry and foods 0 -1 0.2 17.8 -2 -4.2 -2.1 -4.4 0.1 0 0.4 0 -0.2 -0.9 -1 -5.4 
Container Textiles -0.3 -60.4 -3 -662.8 -2.7 -17.9 -2.7 -17.5 0.1 0 0.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -3.3 
Container Metal & chemicals -0.2 -
136.8 
-1.8 -1220 -2.8 -29.4 -2.8 -29.1 0.3 1.7 0.7 4.1 0 -1.2 0 0.1 
Container Machine & equip. -0.1 -34.3 -0.7 -251.7 -1 -13.9 -0.9 -13.1 0 0 0.6 0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -1 
Tanker Oil products -0.3 -31.7 -2.5 -316.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0 0.7 0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.8 -8 
Tanker Gas 0.1 7.7 1.6 180.8 2 0 2.8 0 0.1 0 3.2 0 0.4 0 5.5 0 
Tanker Crude oil 0 -19.6 0 4.7 -0.2 0 -1.7 0 0.2 1.3 1.3 10.8 -0.1 -15.2 -1 -103.6 
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Vessel 
types 
Commodities 
Mexico to 
China USA Venezuela Spain 
Bulk Crop products -0.3 0 1.4 0 -0.6 -3.2 -7 -38.5 -1.3 0 -0.3 0 0.1 0 1.8 0 
Bulk Wheat and grains 0.1 0 0.8 0 -0.5 -0.1 -3.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 0 0 0.7 0 
Bulk Coal -0.9 0 -0.5 0 0.6 0 7.8 0 0.3 0 0.6 0 0.2 0 0.8 0 
Container Forestry and foods 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.9 -0.1 -8.6 -0.8 -67.6 -7.6 -4.9 -7.5 -4.8 0 0.5 0.3 0 
Container Textiles 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.1 0 -2.3 0.1 16.3 -10.9 -7.6 -10.7 -7.5 0 0.2 0.4 0 
Container Metal & chemicals 0.1 4 0.5 16.7 -0.1 -17.5 -0.7 -213.5 -4.4 -40 -4.1 -37.6 0.1 1.6 0.5 0.2 
Container Machine & equip. 0.1 1.4 0.7 11 0 15.4 0.1 95.7 -3.1 -13.8 -2.7 -12 0.1 1.8 0.6 0.1 
Tanker Oil products 0.2 0 0.9 0.1 -0.2 -9.9 -2 -113.7 0 0 0.5 0 0.1 0 0.9 0 
Tanker Gas -0.5 0 3.4 0 -0.5 -0.1 1.3 0.1 0.1 0 3.4 0 -0.5 0 3.5 0 
Tanker Crude oil 0 0.1 3.1 26.7 -0.3 -65.2 -2.3 -614.5 0.6 0 3.4 0 0.3 90.6 3.2 7.2 
Vessel 
types 
Commodities 
Venezuela to 
China USA Belgium Germany 
Bulk Crop products 0.1 0 0.8 0 -0.4 0 -0.3 0 -0.2 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.5 0 
Bulk Wheat and grains 0.1 0 0.6 0 0.2 0 6.4 0 0 0 0.4 0 -0.1 0 0.4 0 
Bulk Coal 0.3 0 0.7 0 -0.6 -0.1 -0.8 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.3 0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0 
Container Forestry and foods 0 0 0.4 0 -0.2 -0.1 -1.3 -0.6 0 0 0.2 0 -0.1 0 0.2 0 
Container Textiles -0.1 0 0.5 0.1 -0.1 0 1.2 0.1 -0.2 0 0.4 0 -0.2 0 0.3 0 
Container Metal & chemicals 0 -0.3 0.4 4.9 -0.7 -7.9 -5.4 -66.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.4 1.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.4 0.9 
Container Machine & equip. -0.2 0 0.6 0 -0.5 -0.4 -3.2 -2.2 -0.2 0 0.5 0 -0.2 0 0.5 0 
Tanker Oil products 0.1 7.1 0.5 26.7 -0.1 -2.8 -0.6 -34.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.4 0 0 0.5 0.5 
Tanker Gas -0.5 0 1.4 0 -0.2 0 3.7 0 -1.1 0 1.1 0 -0.5 0 1.4 0 
Tanker Crude oil 0 1.9 1 52.8 -0.2 -43.6 -1 -272.4 0.2 2.5 1.3 13.1 0.3 3 1.3 12.6 
Note: (a) indicates percentage change, (b) indicates value change ($ million). Numbers rounded to one decimal. Scenario 1 corresponds 
to the Consistent IMO BWM Regulation and Scenario 2 represents the U.S. Stricter BWM Regulation. Results include both absolute 
value changes greater than $10 million and percentage changes greater than 1% for at least one vessel type.  
Source: Authors’ simulations 
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Results for Scenario 1 in Table 3 indicate that if all international and regional regulations 
require similar standards to the BWM Convention, there will be negligible impacts on most 
bilateral trade in the international market. For example, exports of forestry and food products, 
and metal and chemicals commodities from Australia to the U.S. only decrease by 1.6% ($16.5 
million) and 1.3% ($46.1 million), respectively. In Scenario 2, when all ports in the U.S. apply 
stricter BWM regulation, economic impacts are higher and spread across more commodities and 
countries (Table 3). For example, exports of textiles, metal and chemicals, and machines and 
equipment from China to Venezuela decline by 2.6% ($22.1 million), 2.6% ($27.3 million), and 
1% ($36.9 million) in Scenario 1, respectively. These exports fall by 2.9% ($24.7 million), 2.8% 
($29.5 million), and 1.1% ($42.6 million) in Scenario 2, respectively. This is because higher 
transportation costs between the U.S. and all other countries in Scenario 2 cause trade diversion 
resulting from changes in relative shipping costs. Exports from some countries to the U.S. 
decrease substantially in Scenario 2. Specifically, exports from Australia to the U.S. decline at 
relatively high rates. For example, exports of the other agricultural commodities product 
category decrease by 21.1% ($220.9 million), textiles by 33.9% ($83.4 million), metal and 
chemicals by 18.8% ($686.9 million), and machine and equipment by 12.1% ($368.2 million). 
Trade diversion is illustrated when exports of metal and chemicals from Australia to the U.S. 
decrease, as previously described, yet increase to China (+0.14% or +$80 million), Japan 
(+0.37% or +$62 million), and South Korea (+0.5% or +$62 million) (Table S7 in 
Supplementary Material). In this regard, stricter regulation applied to all U.S. ports adversely 
affects exports to the U.S., as expected. Trade diversion also affects domestic and foreign 
production. For example, the impacts on Australian sectors’ performance are relatively higher in 
Scenario 2 (Table S8 in Supplementary Material).  
There are mixes of both positive and negative changes because of the substitution effects 
when global transport costs increase. That is, countries will divert purchases from higher cost 
suppliers with lower cost sources. Also, there are sectoral level substitution effects in each 
country where low cost inputs are used in place of relatively higher cost commodity inputs. For 
example, sectors can substitute between coal, petroleum products, natural gas, and crude oil 
when prices of any commodities increase relative to the others. Table S8 also shows that the 
production levels of sectors in the U.S. are more negatively affected in Scenario 2. This is 
because U.S. sectors face higher costs for imported commodities, thereby increasing production 
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costs. Some sectors, however, experience additional gains because industrial, private and public 
sectors substitute lower cost inputs to replace higher cost commodity inputs. For example, the 
crop product and crude oil sectors increase output levels by 0.51% and 0.17% in Scenario 2, 
respectively, compared to 0.03% and 0.01% in Scenario 1. In this instance, crude oil can be 
substitutable for coal, petroleum products, and natural gas, while crop products are used as 
substitutes for other agricultural products.     
Results indicate macroeconomic effects, including changes in real gross domestic product 
(GDP), real private consumption, and the consumer price index, decline by less than 0.05% in all 
countries for Scenarios 1 and 2. As discussed previously, we expect nominal impacts at the 
global scale given the relatively small increases in international ballast water treatment costs, and 
more importantly, because water transport only accounts for relatively minor contributions to 
total GDP in all countries. For example, water transport contributes 0.2% of GDP in the U.S., 
and 0.5% of world GDP in total. Stricter BWM regulation applied to all U.S. ports in Scenario 2 
negatively affects U.S. economic welfare5 and negatively affects economic welfare of other 
countries by a lesser degree; in both cases, the welfare impacts are nominal. Economic welfare in 
the U.S. decreases by $1.5 billion (-0.01%) in Scenario 1 and $15 billion (-0.11%) in Scenario 2 
(Table 4). Welfare losses are less than 0.2% for all countries considered, and Australia, Canada, 
and Mexico experience higher economic welfare reductions in Scenario 2 resulting from higher 
transport costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 We measure economic welfare in terms of equivalent variation, a money-metric measure of economic well-being 
associated with changes in prices. 
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Table 4. Changes in economic welfare across countries.  
                                   Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
  % change  
Absolute change 
($ million) 
% change  
Absolute change 
($ million) 
Australia -0.03 -300 -0.09 -1,100 
China -0.03 -1,600 -0.02 -1,100 
Japan -0.01 -660 0.00 -200 
South Korea -0.03 -270 -0.02 -180 
Singapore 0.00 -11 0.02 40 
Malaysia -0.06 -140 -0.06 -140 
Taiwan -0.04 -170 -0.03 -130 
USA -0.01 -1,500 -0.11 -15,000 
Canada -0.04 -600 -0.18 -2,800 
Mexico -0.02 -250 -0.11 -1,100 
Colombia -0.02 -49 -0.06 -170 
Panama -0.06 -18 -0.11 -34 
Venezuela -0.05 -140 -0.11 -310 
Belgium 0.01 39 0.03 150 
Germany 0.00 -160 0.00 110 
Spain -0.01 -77 0.00 3 
France 0.00 37 0.01 220 
UK  -0.03 -590 -0.01 -200 
Netherlands -0.01 -84 0.00 -21 
South Africa -0.01 -43 -0.01 -26 
Note: Economic welfare is measured by equivalent variation. Scenario 1 corresponds to the 
Consistent IMO BWM Regulation and Scenario 2 represents the U.S. Stricter BWM Regulation. 
Percentages rounded to two decimals, and dollars rounded to millions, for reader comparison; 
smaller numbers do not imply precision. 
Source: Authors’ simulations. 
3.3 Changes in shipping traffic 
In general, changes in shipping traffic resulting from ballast water regulation are small, and the 
shipping pattern is robust to ballast water regulation. Table 5 reports the routes that have at least 
10 shipping voyages changed for one of the ship types. For container vessels, the shipping 
voyages decline by 21 voyages (of 3640 voyages) at most under both policy scenarios, and most 
of the percentage changes in voyages are less than 1%. The percentage changes in container 
vessel traffic from South Korea to China and Canada to the U.S. are the same (0.2%), but the 
absolute voyage change from South Korea to China is much higher (8133 voyages). This is due 
to the high current voyage numbers from South Korea to China. Stricter U.S. BWM regulation, 
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Scenario 2, has the biggest impact, from a percentage change perspective, on the shipping routes 
for container vessels from Canada and Venezuela to the U.S.  
The changes in bulk vessel traffic are almost the same under both scenarios between Asian 
countries, while bulk vessel traffic decreases more in Scenario 2 for North American routes, such 
as Canada to the U.S. (voyages decrease by 5 to 91 trips), Mexico to the U.S. (voyages decrease 
by 4 to 52 trips), and the U.S. to Canada (voyages decrease by 20 to 45 trips).  
Some routes experience larger decreases for tanker traffic under both policy scenarios, such 
as Malaysia to Singapore, Singapore to Malaysia, and Netherlands to the UK. Scenario 2 brings a 
much larger traffic change than Scenario 1 for the routes from Mexico to the U.S., (voyages 
decrease by 4 to 40 trip) and the U.S. to Mexico (voyages decrease by 1 to 16 trips). The stricter 
ballast water treatment standards in the U.S. under Scenario 2 will reduce the species invasion 
risk to the U.S., and decreased shipping traffic will further decrease species introduction risk by 
limiting the number of voyages. However, one exception to this is for voyages from the U.S. to 
Columbia, where the decline in tanker traffic is smaller when the U.S. adopts stricter regulation 
in Scenario 2. 
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Table 5. Country pairs with largest changes in shipping traffic  
Country 
pair 
Container vessel Bulk vessel Tanker 
Current 
Voyage 
number 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Current 
Voyage 
number 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Current 
Voyage 
number 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Number 
reduced 
% 
Number 
reduced 
% 
Number 
reduced 
% 
Number 
reduced 
% 
Number 
reduced 
% 
Number 
reduced 
% 
KOR/CHN 8,123 14 0.2 15 0.2 1,368 11 0.8 11 0.8 3,259 13 0.4 13 0.4 
JPN/CHN 5,206 14 0.3 17 0.3 872 3 0.3 3 0.3 1,300 2 0.2 2 0.2 
TWN/CHN 6,366 10 0.2 11 0.2 903 9 1.0 9 1.0 1,230 6 0.5 6 0.5 
CHN/JPN 6,077 19 0.3 19 0.3 926 8 0.9 10 1.1 1,200 12 1.0 10 0.8 
KOR/JPN 4,456 15 0.3 16 0.4 1,031 16 1.5 17 1.6 3,671 12 0.3 10 0.2 
SGP/MYS 3,640 21 0.6 22 0.6 533 8 1.5 8 1.5 5,729 29 0.5 26 0.5 
CAN/USA 625 1 0.2 10 1.6 1,535 5 0.3 91 5.9 778 0 0 5 0.6 
CHN/TWN 4,664 8 0.2 7 0.2 956 8 0.8 10 1.1 1,374 17 1.2 17 1.2 
CHN/KOR 7,537 3 0 3 0 2,102 18 0.8 22 1.1 3,797 14 0.4 11 0.3 
USA/CAN 801 2 0.2 5 0.6 1,565 20 1.3 45 2.9 840 0 0 0 0 
CHN/AUS 292 0 0 1 0.3 3,747 6 0.2 24 0.6 40 0 0 0 0 
JPN/AUS - - - - - 1,758 3 0.2 12 0.7 77 0 0 0 0 
MEX/USA 700 0 0 1 0.1 757 4 0.5 52 6.9 1,738 4 0.2 40 2.3 
MYS/SGP 5,000 7 0.1 7 0.1 570 4 0.7 4 0.7 5,946 50 0.8 51 0.9 
NLD/GBR 3,287 4 0.1 4 0.1 988 0 0 1 0.1 5,103 36 0.7 43 0.8 
USA/COL 271 1 0.4 2 0.7 122 0 0 1 0.8 438 19 4.3 3 0.7 
USA/MEX 381 1 0.3 3 0.8 612 2 0.3 5 0.8 1,773 1 0.1 16 0.9 
Note: Scenario 1 corresponds to the Consistent IMO BWM Regulation and Scenario 2 represents the U.S. Stricter BWM Regulation. 
The routes shown have at least 10 shipping voyages in traffic change for one of the ship types. No container vessel traffic exists from 
Japan to Australia. Percentages rounded to one decimal. Countries are shown in International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
codes: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/knowledgebase/country-code. 
Source: Authors’ simulations 
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3.4 Comparison with studies on environmental policies 
The environmental policies for BWM examined in this study target increased costs for 
marine transport. Spillover effects are then spread throughout the economy. Since the marine 
transport sector only accounts for small contributions to individual country GDP, and comprise 
0.5% of world GDP, BWM policies we investigate have minor economic impacts at aggregate 
levels for trade, output and national economic welfare for each country in this study. Other 
environmental or climate-related policies, such as carbon taxes, emissions trading schemes 
(ETS), and energy taxes, are found to impose higher costs on national economies than the costs 
we estimate for BWM scenarios. For example, Adams et al. estimated that an international ETS 
to decrease global emission levels by 5% in 2050 relative to 2000 levels would decrease real 
GDP of Australia by 1.1% by 2030 relative to the base case scenario, while real household 
consumption and imports would decline by 1.5% and 2%, respectively (Adams et al., 2014). 
Using different assumptions and emission quotas of an ETS to achieve the 2030 target of 28% 
below the 2005 level in Australia, Nong et al. found a decline of 1.6% of Australian real GDP by 
2030 relative to the baseline when examining the impacts of such ETS in Australia. Real exports 
and imports for Australia would also fall by 2.77% and 2.94%, respectively (Nong et al., 2017). 
Carbon tax studies in South Africa find real GDP decreases by 1-1.59% under different carbon 
tax rates from $9.15 to $30 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) (Alton et al., 2014, 
Nong, 2020). An international carbon tax study of $50 per ton of CO2e also indicates that real 
GDP would decline by 0.94–1.28% for the United States, 0.66–1.54% for China, 0.34–0.57% for 
India, 0.44–0.55% for Brazil, and 0.12% for the European Union (Nong and Simshauser, 2020).  
Energy tax scenarios impose much larger economic costs than explored in our analysis and 
find larger unfavorable impacts. Tax rates of 5–15% on energy, for example, simulate a decrease 
of 0.27–1.13% in Chinese GDP (Peng et al., 2019). Energy taxes associated with renewable 
energy development and proper revenue recycling mechanisms equal to a 7% tax rate would 
decrease real GDP of Spain by 0.08–0.1% (Freire-González and Puig-Ventosa, 2019). Nong et 
al. also found that substantial increases in energy taxes of 50% for coal and 33% for petroleum 
products would reduce real GDP of Vietnam by 1.05% and 2.23%, respectively, with private 
consumption declines ranging from 0.34 to 1.06% (Nong et al., 2019).  
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It is worth noting that the impacts of a carbon tax, ETS, or energy tax vary across countries, 
depending on several key factors. Economic effects depend on the magnitudes of the costs 
imposed, the market structures and market shares of energy/emission-intensive sectors and 
expenditure shares for energy commodities, details of revenue recycling mechanisms, and on the 
extent of sector coverage in each country and potential policy. These environmental or climate 
change policies in the literature focus on reduced greenhouse gas emission levels and apply to 
most (if not all) sectors in the economy, while BWM regulations impose direct costs on the 
marine transport sector.   
Both the costs imposed and economic impacts of BWM regulations are also small relative to 
other transport costs studies. For example, Bekkers et al. (2018) found that melting Arctic sea ice 
enabling the Northern Sea Route with transportation cost reductions between Northern Europe 
and East Asia by 20–30% for all goods transported by sea would affect bilateral real exports 
from China by -0.51% to 11.98%, and Japan by -0.49% to 16.23%. Real GDP is also affected 
differently from -0.1% to 0.4% across countries (Bekkers et al., 2018). On the same topic, but 
also accounting for the additional new route of the Northwest Passage connecting Northeast Asia 
and the U.S. east coast, Countryman et al. (2016) found major impacts on trade of different 
countries resulting from decreased shipping costs given shorter shipping distances through the 
Arctic. They found that transportation costs between China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the 
U.S. east coast would decrease by 6.8–11.2% for all sea transport, while transport costs for 
routes between Europe and Northeast Asian countries would decrease even further. For example, 
shipping costs between East Asian nations and Germany would decrease by 19.9–39.4%. As a 
result, U.S. exports were simulated to increase by 13.5% to China, 13.5% to Japan, and 5% to 
South Korea. Real GDP changes across countries vary from -0.5% to 1%, and are notably higher 
than the GDP effects of BWM because the costs changes are of larger magnitudes and affect all 
goods transported by sea between these regions (Countryman et al., 2016).   
 This policy review shows that the costs imposed by the aforementioned policies are 
relatively much higher than those derived from examining BWM policies in the present study. 
Accordingly, results from other environmental policy studies are substantially higher at 
aggregate and sectoral levels than the economic effects of alternate BWM policy scenarios 
investigated in this work. However, it is important to note that while the costs and resulting 
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economic impacts of BWM are minor across countries at aggregate levels, potential 
environmental benefits from BWM may be more widespread across countries and sectors and 
merit investigation in future work. Further research to explore the benefits of improved 
environmental quality relative to the costs that we estimate is warranted.   
4. Conclusion and implications 
This study provides a noteworthy contribution to explore the viability to drive ballast water 
management policies forward, as well as to integrated economic modeling research. We investigate 
the impacts of international ballast water policy on transport costs, international trade, national 
economies and global shipping patterns. Our findings are consistent with fundamental trade 
theory and show that the costs of environmental action through BWM in the shipping industry 
have small economic consequences at aggregate levels but vary in magnitude for bilateral trade 
of specific commodities between certain countries.  
Specifically, our work provides three key findings: 1) current BWM regulation that is 
uniform across countries (Scenario 1) has nominal negative economic impacts across countries; 
2) the proposed scenario of stricter BWM regulation imposed for transport to/from U.S. ports 
(Scenario 2) has minor effects on trade and national economies at aggregate levels, but causes 
noteworthy trade reductions of certain commodities between some countries; 3) BWM policies 
under uniform and stricter standards lead to modest changes in global shipping patterns.  
Findings suggest that international ballast water treatment regulation, even when the U.S. 
applies stricter standards, has minor effects on the global economy when considering changes in 
international trade, economic welfare, and shipping patterns, yet increased environmental quality 
can be achieved. However, it is important to consider both aggregate and bilateral trade effects 
when imposing increased transport costs to achieve invasive species risk reduction through 
BWM since considerable sector, and country-specific effects are masked when assessing 
economic effects at aggregate levels across countries.    
Results show that changes in shipping costs vary across vessel types, as well as between 
trade partners because of different trade volumes and values. We find that shipping costs 
between the U.S. and its trade partners only change slightly in Scenario 1 and are higher for 
some routes in Scenario 2 due to stricter regulation at U.S. ports. Such cost changes yield 
relatively small adverse impacts on the global economy for both scenarios due to small shares of 
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the marine transportation sector in the overall economy in each country. However, the trade 
impacts for certain commodities between countries shipped by different vessel types are highly 
affected due to relatively high increased shipping costs of vessels for certain shipping routes, 
including trade between Australia and the U.S., for example. Due to modest changes in total 
trade values/volumes, there are also only minor changes in shipping voyages at the global scale. 
Both uniform and stricter BWM standards negatively affect global economic welfare by 
small rates, driven by the small share of total global GDP (0.5%) attributed to the marine 
transport sector. Stricter regulation increases the transportation costs for commodities originating 
from any trade partner to the U.S. market. However, the U.S. is a large trade partner of many 
countries around the world, and the costs of BWM are shared across voyages for each vessel 
type. As a result, the overall marine transport services costs in all countries increase at higher 
rates in Scenario 2 relative to the increases in Scenario 1 – when all countries apply an 
international BWM standard regulation. Since costs of commodities exported to the U.S. market 
increase, trade is diverted as exporters find other countries for their export products. One key 
example of trade diversion can be seen for Australian producers of forest products and foods, 
textiles, metal and chemicals, and machine and equipment, which increased exports to all other 
countries at the expense of the U.S. in Scenario 2 when shipping to the U.S. becomes 
substantially more expensive for this route under stricter BWM regulation. However, trade 
effects from these cost signals may result in perturbations to the volume of trade (as per GTAP 
output) or to other shifts in shipping patterns or fleet operations not modeled here 
Economic welfare losses are small for all countries when compared to the size of each 
national economy. U.S. economic welfare losses are the highest, though are nominal, totaling -
$1,500 in Scenario 1 and -$14,800 in Scenario 2. Other key exporters to the U.S. including 
Australia, Canada, and Mexico face decreased economic welfare by lesser magnitudes than the 
U.S. Results confirm that stricter BWM standards applied to U.S. ports affect U.S. producers the 
most, followed by key U.S. trading partners. While our work focuses on the economic costs of 
BWM regulation, research to investigate the benefits of increased environmental quality due to 
stricter BWM standards is warranted for further study to provide decision makers with an 
evaluation of the net benefits of BWM and the cost-effectiveness thresholds of potential policy 
measures.  
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Appendix A: Map of commodity types with vessel types 
The GTAP model includes 57 commodity types that we aggregate to 17 sector groups. The 17 
sectors are mapped to 8 vessel types according to industry practice (UNCTAD, 2017).  
Table A1. GTAP commodity mapping to vessel types  
GTAP Commodities 
Aggregated 
commodities 
Vessel types 
Group 
number 
OCR (Crops nec) Crop products Bulk 1 
WHT (Wheat) Wheat & grains Bulk 2 
GRO (Cereal grains nec) Wheat & grains Bulk 2 
SGR (Sugar) Forestry and foods Con/Bulk 3 
PDR (Paddy rice) Forestry and foods Container 3 
OSD (Oil seeds) Forestry and foods Container 3 
C_B (Sugar cane, sugar beet) Forestry and foods Container 3 
PFB (Plant-based fibers) Forestry and foods Container 3 
WOL (Wool, silk-worm cocoons) Forestry and foods Container 3 
FRS (Forestry) Forestry and foods Container 3 
PCR (Processed rice) Forestry and foods Container 3 
OFD (Food products nec) Forestry and foods Container 3 
B_T (Beverages and tobacco products) Forestry and foods Container 3 
CTL (cattle, sheep and goats, horses) Life animal Livestock carrier 4 
V_F (Vegetables, fruit, nuts) Meats & vegetable Refrigeration 5 
FSH (Fishing) Meats & vegetable Refrigeration 5 
CMT (Bovine meat products) Meats & vegetable Refrigeration 5 
OMT (Meat products nec) Meats & vegetable Refrigeration 5 
VOL (Vegetable oils and fats) Meats & vegetable Refrigeration 5 
MIL (Dairy products) Meats & vegetable Refrigeration 5 
OAP (Animal products nec) Meats & vegetable Refrigeration 5 
RMK (Raw milk) Meats & vegetable Refrigeration 5 
TEX (Textiles) Textiles Container 6 
WAP (Wearing apparel) Textiles Container 6 
LEA (Leather products) Textiles Container 6 
LUM (Wood products) Textiles con/bulk 6 
PPP (Paper products, publishing) Textiles Container 6 
CRP (Chemical, rubber, plastic) Metal & chemicals con/bulk 7 
OMN (Minerals nec) Metal & chemicals con/bulk 7 
NMM (Mineral products nec) Metal & chemicals con/bulk 7 
I_S (Ferrous metals) Metal & chemicals con/bulk 7 
NFM (Metals nec) Metal & chemicals con/bulk 7 
FMP (Metal products) Metal & chemicals con/bulk 7 
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Table A1. GTAP commodity mapping to vessel types (continued) 
ELE (Electronic equipment) Machine & equipment Container 8 
OME (Machinery and equipment 
nec) 
Machine & equipment Container 8 
OMF (Manufactures nec) Machine & equipment Container 8 
OTN (Transport equipment nec) Machine & equipment General cargo 8 
MVH (Motor vehicles and parts) Motor vehicles Vehicle 9 
ELY (Electricity) Electricity  10 
COA (Coal) Coal Bulk 11 
P_C (Petroleum, coal products) Petroleum products Tanker 12 
OIL (Oil) Crude oil Tanker 13 
GAS (Gas) Natural gas LG/pipeline 14 
WTP (Water transport) Water transport  15 
OTP (Transport nec) Other transport  16 
ATP (Air transport) Other transport  16 
GDT (Gas manufacture, 
distribution) 
Other Services  17 
WTR (Water) Other Services  17 
CNS (Construction) Other Services  17 
TRD (Trade) Other Services  17 
CMN (Communication) Other Services  17 
OFI (Financial services nec) Other Services  17 
ISR (Insurance) Other Services  17 
OBS (Business services nec) Other Services  17 
ROS (Recreational and other 
services) 
Other Services  17 
OSG (Public Administration, etc.) Other Services  17 
DWE (Dwellings) Other Services  17 
Source: Commodity cargo and vessels matched and summarized by authors.  
 
